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The Investment Function Revisited: Disciplining Capital in Korea 
 
 Abstract 
 
Post-Keynesian and Marxian macro models assume that wage increases that lower profits have 
an adverse impact on investment spending. The experience of Korea during the period 1975-
1993 contradicts this assumption. This paper reports results obtained from estimating a modified 
neo-Kaleckian investment function that examines the impact of increases in the wage share on 
business spending. Results of the Granger tests that assess the direction of causality between 
wages, investment, and productivity are also given. Tests indicate that lagged values of the wage 
share of income have a positive impact on investment. There are several explanations for this, 
most of which stem from restrictions on foreign direct investment, and the government's ability 
to discipline capital through its control over loanable funds coupled with the use of measurable 
benchmarks in export sales in return for access to subsidized credit and other "carrots." Firms 
appear to be constrained by these factors to respond to wages hikes by adopting technological 
upgrades, thereby raising productivity and maintaining export competitiveness. 
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The Investment Function Revisited: Disciplining Capital in Korea 
I. Introduction 
 The growing body of research that investigates the relationship between wages, output 
and employment from a heterodox perspective highlights the dual and conflicting role of wages 
which are both a cost of production but also a source of aggregate demand.  Extending these 
ideas, Bowles and Boyer (1990) have incorporated a third role for wages, that of influencing 
worker motivation and thereby labor productivity. Recent work along this trajectory suggests 
that while a “stagnationist” outcome (a redistribution to wages stimulates employment and 
growth) is possible in a closed economy, economic openness creates the conditions for an 
“exhilarationsist” or profit-led regime to flourish.1 
 Briefly, a stagnationist outcome is more likely to occur in a closed economy, especially if 
capitalist saving propensities are greater than those of workers, with a redistribution to workers 
stimulating consumption. The redistribution has an “accelerator effect” on investment demand 
that may outweigh the negative effect of higher wages on profits, with the result that output and 
employment may rise. The potential for this happy outcome may not hold in an open economy, 
however, since the effect of higher wages on aggregate demand is more ambiguous. This is 
because while higher wages may stimulate domestic consumption, export demand is likely to fall 
by a proportionately larger amount. Higher wages then negatively affect profitability and 
demand, both determinants of investment. As a result, business spending, output, and 
employment will fall. More structurally sensitive macro models point out, however, that the 
relationship between wages and growth in an open economy is mediated by structural features of 
the economy such as the price elasticity of exports and the rigidity of imports (Blecker 1989, 
1 See for example the work of Blecker (1989), Dutt (1984, 1990),  Lavoie (1995), Kurz (1990), 
 4
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Taylor 1991, Seguino 1994).  
 Whatever the variation in the fully developed macro models, central to the analysis of 
how wages interact with output, employment, and growth is the relationship between wages, 
profitability, and investment. While many aspects of investment functions have been debated, 
there seems to be broad agreement in the heterodox camp that investment spending responds 
positively to profitability, whether measured as the rate of profit or the profit share. It is this 
basic tenet of these models that this paper calls into question, using the case of Korea as an 
example of a economy in which increases in the wage share of income have stimulated rather 
than depressed investment spending.  
 To present this research, the paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly discusses the 
theoretical and empirical literature on the factors that influence business spending. Section III 
provides an analysis of the institutional environment that shapes business spending decisions. 
Section IV presents results of statistical analyses that test the relationship between investment 
and wages, and between wages and productivity growth. Finally, Section V concludes with 
summary comments.   
II. Investment, Profits, and Wages: The Literature 
 This section briefly considers the theoretical and empirical literature on the determinants 
of business spending or investment demand. Although our focus is primarily on heterodox 
approaches which explicitly examine the interrelationship between income distribution and 
investment, a brief reference to neoclassical approaches is useful. 
 Pared down benchmark neoclassical models of investment demand are based on the 
firm’s assessment of the marginal costs and benefits of additions to its capital stock, which are 
 
Marglin and Bhaduri (1990), Rowthorn (1982), Taylor (1991), and You (1991). 
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determined by price variables and output variables (the so-called “accelerator” effect).2 Later 
models came to incorporate the assumption that adjustment of capacity takes time with firms 
only partially adjusting their capital stock in the short run to attain a longer run desired level of 
the capital stock. Wages, if they are included in these models, enter only indirectly, via the effect 
on the relative price of inputs. Higher wages may induce a substitution to capital in the short run, 
thereby stimulating investment spending. But the demand-side effect of higher wages is not 
considered, and even the potential for the cost effect of higher wages to stimulate businesses to 
substitute away from labor inputs gets very little attention. Profitability, measured as the profit 
share, is not considered to be a significant factor affecting investment behavior while the profit 
rate is only tangentially included as a measure of the cost of capital. 
 Kalecki (1971) and Keynes (1936) differed from neoclassicals in emphasizing that 
financial conditions are primary determinants of investment. The effect of liquidity or internal 
financing is incorporated because, it is argued, large firms with sufficient internal funds may 
invest despite external constraints in financial markets. Since profits are an important source of 
internal financing for firms, they are posited to have a positive effect on investment spending---
the so-called “profitability effect.” Other non-exclusive explanations for the role of profitability 
in influencing business spending can be advanced. Profits are a primary motivation for firm 
investment behavior, with current measures of profitability providing the information for firms to 
form expectations about future profitability. Profits may also induce firms to undertake new 
investment in the face of uncertain product demand. You (1991) has highlighted the relationship 
between capital mobility and the profitability effect (which measures the sensitivity of 
investment to changes in measures of profitability), arguing that in a closed economy with 
2 For a review of this group of models, see Chirinko (1993). 
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restrictions on capital mobility, the size of the profitability effect will be smaller than in more 
open economies in which there are a broader array of “substitutes” for investment in the 
domestic economy.  
 Steindl (1976) and others have further noted that changes in the rate of capacity 
utilization affect investment behavior because firms desire to maintain some excess capacity in 
order to meet surges in demand. Relative costs--wages and interest rates--enter heterodox models 
via their effect on measures of profitability. 
 In general, there is remarkable similarity in the specification of neo-Kaleckian investment 
functions, with one exception. Just how profitability should be measured has been the subject of 
extensive debate (Marglin and Bhaduri 1990, Lavoie 1992, 1995). Numerous authors have 
argued that the rate of profit is the preferred indicator, with the rate of profit defined   
    r = (R/Y) (Y/K) = Βu      (1) 
where R is gross profits, Y is actual output, K is the capital stock, Β = R/Y is the profit share of 
income, u = Y/K is the output/capital ratio and serves as a measure of capacity utilization. The 
investment function is simply written (with expected comparative static signs above the 
independent variables):  
                  +  + 
                                        I/K = hK =  h ( r, u, )      (2) 
 
or, in linearized form and using (1), 
   I/K = hK = ao + a1r + a2u =  ao + (a1 Β + a2)u,   (2') 
where hK  is the desired rate of capital accumulation and a0 is an exogenously determined 
constant reflecting the state of  “animal spirits.”  
 Marglin and Bhaduri (1990) have pointed out that (2') leads to double counting of the 
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effect of utilization on I/K since r = Βu, with a2u capturing the direct effect and a1r the indirect 
effect.3 Further, they argue that a2 =  ΜhK/Μu, which is the change in hK as a result of a change 
in u, holding r constant. But holding r constant as u rises implies that Β must fall by a 
proportionate amount. Thus if  a2 is positive, the implication is that when u rises, despite the fall 
in Β, firms unequivocally desire to invest more, which is a strong assumption. Marglin and 
Bhaduri make the claim that (2') is a special case of the investment function, and opt for the 
profit share as the profitability variable so as to avoid the problems noted above. Adopting the 
profit share as the measure of profitability then, the investment function is  
        + + 
    I/K =  gK =   g( Β, u )                  (3)  
        
or, for estimation purposes, 
         I/K =  gK = bo + b1Β + b2 u.     (3') 
 
 Results of empirical tests of the neo-Kaleckian investment function do not appear to turn 
on the profitability measure. Both the profit rate and the profit share have been found to be 
significant in explaining investment spending and growth of the capital stock in OECD countries 
over the last twenty five years, with profits exerting a positive effect on business spending and 
capital stock growth (Bhaskar and Glyn 1995, Bowles and Boyer 1995, Glyn 1997, Henley and 
Tskalatos 1991).4 
3 Lavoie (1995) points out that double counting is not necessarily problematic since the firm's 
profit rate is a signal to lenders of the firm’s creditworthiness, and thus has a positive effect on  
investment, independent of any effect a high rate of utilization may have on firms’ desire to 
invest. 
4 Fazzari and Mott (1982) and Fazzari (1992) estimate investment functions for the US, 
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 An interesting exception to the positive relationship between profitability and investment 
is noted by Bhaskar and Glyn (1995). For Japan, they found that, although the growth rate of the 
capital stock was negatively affected by declining profitability in the 1960s and 1970s as would 
be anticipated, that relationship subsequently changed. Despite continued declines in profitability 
in the 1980s, manufacturing investment was strong in contrast to the presumed positive 
relationship between profits and investment. While they do not advance reasons for this 
outcome, it is useful to note that the result may be in part due to the fact that internal finance 
plays a lesser role in funding new investment in the non-financial corporate sector in Japan than 
in other OECD countries (Corbett and Jenkinson 1996). Pointing to the example of Japan, 
Bhaskar and Glyn (1995) argue that the benchmark neo-Kaleckian investment model cannot 
fully capture the complexity of expectation formation amongst capitalists, suggesting the 
importance of understanding more fully the institutional environment in which these decisions 
are made. That argument is relevant to the case of Korea to which we now turn our attention. 
 
III. Business Investment Determinants in Korea: The Institutional Context 
 A. The State and the Institutional Determinants of Investment  
 The investment climate in Korea has been strongly affected by the state in its self-
declared role as coordinator of economic activity in efforts to promote an export-led growth 
model. Much ink has been spilled in describing the ways the state has disciplined labor as part of 
this strategy, with a number of authors arguing that low wages are a stimulus to both export 
demand and profits. Labor repression has indeed been omnipresent for most of the past thirty 
 
explicitly using internal finance as an independent variable in place of a proxy profitability 
measure. Their results point to the positive role of internal finance on investment behavior, and 
the insignificance of the interest rate as an explanatory variable. 
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years, making possible low wage payments and thus cheap exports (Deyo 1989, Ogle 1990, 
Hart-Landsberg 1993, You 1995). Gender discrimination has also been named as suspect, with 
gender norms and stereotypes as well as state- and firm-level practices serving to “crowd” 
women into jobs in the labor-intensive export goods sector. These various practices have limited 
women’s bargaining power vis-à-vis employers, thereby contributing to low wage payments to 
women and strong export growth (Nam 1994, Seguino 1997). 
 Amsden (1989) was one of the first to point out the importance of the state’s efforts to 
discipline not only labor but also capital as a part of the export-led growth strategy. While her 
work is widely cited, few have taken Amsden’s propositions further by intensively examining the 
implications of her claims for our understanding of the relationship between income distribution 
and growth. As Amsden has noted, real wages rose rapidly in spite of  labor repression, but this 
did not seem to slow investment or growth, “exhilarationist” expectations of open economies 
notwithstanding. It would appear that Korean firms have responded to a much more complex set 
of economic stimuli than envisioned in theoretical models, with these stimuli mediating between 
income distribution and macroeconomic performance in ways that are perhaps unexpected in an 
export-reliant and semi-open economy. We explore these stimuli as a first step in deciphering the 
relationship between wages and investment. 
 The state has played a central role in shaping the business investment climate, using a 
variety of carrots and sticks to achieve their goals. The Korean state’s efforts to discipline capital 
coincided with the assumption of power by General Park Chung Hee and the subsequent 
adoption of the export-led growth strategy in the early 1960s. Almost immediately after the 
military coup, business leaders who had profited (often illegally) under the previous import 
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substitution regime were rounded up. Using the Law on Illicit Accumulation of Wealth, Park 
threatened the businessmen with confiscation of assets unless they agreed to establish new 
industrial firms in basic industries and donate shares to the government (Jones and Sakong, 1980, 
Amsden 1989, Kim 1997). This was but a first measure taken by the state to discipline business 
as a means to ensure fulfillment of its development goals. 
 As a further tool of industrial policy and in efforts to provide a context in which it could 
shape business investment, the state severely restricted foreign direct investment in Korea, 
except in industries where it wished to develop technical capacity, in particular the electronics 
sector. Restrictions on foreign exchange conversion, relaxed slightly in the mid-1980s, also 
limited the options of domestic firms by reducing their flexibility to move offshore in response to 
changing economic conditions at home (Lindner 1994). 
 The centerpiece of the state’s economic growth strategy, however, was policy-based 
lending which was made possible by nationalizing the banking sector in 1961. Subsidized and 
targeted credit, sometimes available at a negative real cost due to inflation, was an important 
carrot that helped to shape firm investment behavior in a way that fit with the state’s goal of first 
ensuring Korea’s export success, and second, of moving the economy up the industrial ladder to 
the production of capital- and skill- intensive goods first for the domestic and then for foreign 
markets. State-allocated cheap credit provided firms with an attractive alternative to curb 
financing where nominal interest rates approached 40-70 percent per annum compared to 17-25 
percent from formal sector banks (Kim 1997, Bank of Korea 1994). Although firms might 
theoretically tap external sources of commercial credit which would have afforded greater 
flexibility in making investment decisions, this avenue was also heavily influenced by state 
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intervention. The Korean government provided guarantees of loan repayment on external loans, 
thereby eliminating risks of default and exchange rate variability to borrowers and inducing large 
capital inflows from foreign lenders. The state further directed this source of financing to 
targeted industries.5 
 The government required growth of output, exports, and investment in return for the 
carrots it offered firms which, in addition to cheap credit, included subsidies and tax breaks that 
varied over time with the changes in industrial policy (Chang 1994, Chung 1994). Protection of 
domestic industries from imports further induced firms to move into new economic activities. 
Import restrictions, which were frequently time-limited and performance-based, provided the 
opportunity for windfall profits since those firms that met export goals and investment targets 
could obtain permission to import restricted goods to be sold at windfall profits on the domestic 
market. Further, firms that produced for export were able to benefit from discriminatory pricing, 
selling export goods in the domestic market at sometimes more than double the price they could 
fetch on international markets (Cho 1985). While the forgoing may suggest a partnership 
between the state and business similar to that which exists in Japan, the Korean state has clearly 
been the senior partner and has not hesitated to discipline junior. The collective of policies 
outlined here allowed the state to effectively build a wall around private corporations, placing 
boundaries on the ability of this captive audience to respond to changes in the economic 
environment.  
 A discussion of the institutional context would not be complete without reference to the 
recent changes in the rules of the accumulation game. The state-chaebol power dynamic has 
5 Rationing credit in a sophisticated economy may seem to be a difficult task for government, but 
that job was made much less complex in South Korea by the extreme concentration of the 
manufacturing sector. As early as 1981, the top three chaebol produced 62 percent of output, a 
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shifted in recent years, due to market liberalization and the increased size and breadth of chaebol 
activities coupled with moral hazard problems associated with the indebtedness of chaebol. But 
while much has been made of the move toward financial and trade liberalization in the 1980s 
(World Bank 1993, Chung 1994) at least up to 1989, the changes were more superficial than real. 
In 1981, for example, the government sold off its bank shares to the private sector and relaxed 
restrictions on private ownership of banks.6 Nevertheless, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
continued to exert influence over the costs of capital and the allocation of capital. Further, the 
MOF influences appointments of bank officers and has intervened at high levels in banks to offer 
“advice” on loan and deposit rates. Financial institutions are also supposed to set aside a portion 
of their loanable funds for small- and medium-size firms, and the government still targets 
industries for preferential credit, though in a less overt way than in the past. The significance of 
these controls in influencing business financing and investment has really only decreased 
recently with the more complete liberalization of financial markets, including reduced 
restrictions on ownership of domestic banks by foreign firms. 
 With regard to trade liberalization, while some restrictions have been relaxed, the state 
has not hesitated to ban or place high tariffs on imported goods that jeopardized domestic 
industries when it has deemed necessary.  Further, rules that limit inward and outward foreign 
direct investment have been reduced to some extent. Even so, by 1992 total inward and outward 
investment accounted for less than two percent of gross fixed private capital formation 
(compared to, for example, 13 percent in Taiwan and 19 percent in Singapore)  (Seguino 1997). 
 Pang and Lim (1989), Amsden and Euh (1993) and Amsden (1994) argue that since the 
 
figure than is higher even than that of Japan (in 1980) at 56.3 percent (Amsden 1989). 
6 New regulations permitted firms to buy no more than 8 percent of  banks’ stock, though this 
has not prevented instances in which chaebol virtually controlled some commercial banks.   
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early 1980s, industrial policy has been carried out not so much by lowering the cost of capital for 
targeted industries as by providing tax breaks for R&D, financing joint ventures in R&D 
between business and government, and by acting as a procurement agent for foreign technology. 
The fact remains that the state continues to possess the ability to affect investment decisions, 
though in a different manner than in earlier years, and with the caveat that some firms have 
greater autonomy than previously.7    
 
 B. Wages, Investment and Growth in Korea 
 In addition to using trade, industrial, and financial market policies to circumscribe 
business behavior, the state has intervened to place boundary conditions on the distribution of 
income in a way that did not disrupt the growth process. As noted earlier, repressive labor laws 
permitted only very limited labor union activity and gender discrimination has been condoned 
and even practiced extensively by the state. Further, the state has set maximum wage guidelines 
with firms paying wages in excess of the guidelines ineligible for subsidized credit and other 
carrots. And yet, the government has also encouraged firms to raise workers’ wages within 
bounds. It is likely that part of the state’s interest in resolving the distributional conflict in Korea 
through moderate and predictable wage increases is that this might serve to attenuate resistance 
to what otherwise would be considered an illegitimate and undemocratic regime. As a result, and 
contrary to some perceptions of the Korean case, wage increases were not banned. Rather, 
manufacturing wages in Korea increased five-fold in real terms from 1975 to 1990. Although 
wages rose from a low base, sustained real wage growth in an export-oriented economy is rare. 
7 More recent changes, such as the more complete financial market liberalization in 1997 and the 
proposed IMF conditionality associated with the $50 billion bail out of the financial sector, 
however, may spell the end to this era of state-led and -guided growth. 
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 What has been the relationship between wages, investment, and growth in the Korean 
economy? Shapiro and Taylor (1994) suggest that real wage growth may be central to the 
industrialization process, and argue that aiming for low wages alone is not viable or sustainable. 
They note that “South Korea would never have shifted exports from human hair to autos and 
electronics had wages stayed at 1955 levels” (1994: 872).  You (1994) has argued that 
suppression of labor disputes combined with orderly wage increases kept “animal spirits” 
buoyant, and it is this aspect of labor repression, not keeping wages low, that has been important 
to Korean growth. Amsden (1989) has advanced an efficiency wage argument for the 
compatibility of rising wages with growth in an export-oriented economy, contending that wage 
increases have induced workers to exercise their intelligence on the job in industries which 
require significant learning on the shop floor in order for the firm to successfully adapt 
unfamiliar borrowed technologies. Without formally modelling this relationship, she implies that 
higher wages that raise labor productivity lower unit labor costs, making exports more 
competitive, producing a demand-side effect that stimulates investment spending. 
 These combined perspectives lead to the observation that there are boundary conditions 
on wage payments which, in order to promote growth, should be neither be too high nor too low. 
On the one hand, it can be argued that wage growth that exceeds productivity growth raises unit 
labor costs, and results in declining demand for exports and thus investment spending. Further, 
slack demand for exports results in a shortage of foreign exchange necessary for the purchase of 
imported capital goods that raise productivity. On the other hand, wages that are too low may 
alleviate any pressure on firms to upgrade technologically, with the economy’s productivity 
growth stagnating due to reliance on labor-intensive low-wage production methods. In either 
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case, an important question is how wages affect investment spending, both because business 
spending has a demand-side effect and because investment in equipment that is labor-saving can 
lower unit labor costs, thereby stimulating export demand in a virtuous cycle of wage growth!>  
investment !> productivity growth!> export growth. 
 The trick, of course, is to ensure that business responds to wage shifts in the desired way-
-by investing in equipment and processes that lower unit labor costs. In an open economy with 
liberalized markets, it may be difficult to induce firms to technologically upgrade when there is 
an option to respond to the declining profitability that real wage increases bring by running to 
lower wage sites. 
 But in Korea, the state effectively fashioned an incentive structure that allowed and 
indeed forced firms to take the desired path, thereby maintaining Korea’s export competitiveness 
while moving the economy up the industrial ladder and facilitating import substitution. Higher 
wages put a squeeze on profits, since competition in global markets forced firms to absorb some 
of the wage increases. By holding out the carrot of subsidies and import allowances that would 
boost profits, however, the state encouraged firms to respond to unit labor cost increases by 
raising productivity. Had this challenge been left unaddressed, firms would have been inclined to 
pass on a large portion of the higher costs, resulting in fewer export sales and loss of access to 
the designated rewards. 
 This strategy might not have worked in an environment with greater physical capital 
mobility, but restrictions on foreign direct investment and foreign exchange conversion limited, 
in the aggregate, the options of firms to run from higher wages. It is also likely that this strategy 
worked in Korea at this semi-industrialized stage of development since there continued to be 
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potential for manufacturing industries to capital-deepen and the necessary capital goods and 
technologies were available from industrialized countries.8  
  An important element of this strategy was the state’s control over the banking sector 
which eased the need for firms to rely on internal finance as the source of funds for physical 
capital investment. Table 1 shows sources of finance for investment in the non-financial 
corporate sector. On average, internal financing has accounted for only about 50.3 percent of 
total sources of financing with net bank lending 23.4 percent on average, though this percentage 
has fallen in recent years. This contrasts sharply with the United States and United Kingdom for 
the period 1970-89 where internal finance constituted 91.3 percent and 97.3 percent, 
respectively, of total sources of financing. Internal financing comprises an even smaller share of 
total net sources of financing in Korea than in Japan where the average for 1970-89 was 69.3 
percent (Corbett and Jenkinson 1996).   
[Table 1 about here]. 
 The significance of a system in which firms rely more heavily on debt financing can be 
argued as follows. To assess eligibility in allocating bank credit, the state has relied more heavily 
on the firms’s performance in terms of exports, investment, and output than on the typical 
measures of creditworthiness used by private banks--the rate of profit or other measures of 
profitability. As such we would expect profitability to have been less important in explaining 
8 The Korean economy may also be at a turning point in this regard. As Korea becomes an 
important competitor to industrialized country firms, there is greater reluctance to license or sell 
technology to Korean firms. Government leverage is attempting to overcome this problem, but it 
nevertheless has arisen as an important barrier in recent years. Further, Korean firms have 
virtually caught up with industrialized country firms in terms of automated production processes. 
Where it remains behind is in design and development of new products (Hobday 1995). Thus 
higher wages may or may not continue to stimulate investment spending and productivity 
growth, depending on the adaptability of institutional arrangements between the state and firms 
to new conditions.  
 17
                                                          
investment behavior. 
 The institutional arrangements described here appear to mediate between wage increases 
and investment spending (and by extension output and employment) in Korea. To clarify how 
these variables are related, Figure 1 provides a sketch of two possible chains of causality with the 
former likely to occur in an open economy with no state intervention in financial markets, and 
the latter more indicative of processes in Korea under the institutional and policy relationships 
described above.  
 
[Figure 1 about here]. 
 
 Case A describes a classical Marxian business cycle driven by profit squeeze effects.9 
Case B describes what appears to be the Korean case where the profit squeeze effects of higher 
wages are overcome by institutional and financial arrangements that allow firms to borrow rather 
than rely fully on retained earnings to realize new investment. Moreover, the system offers 
additional inducements for firms to do so, thereby offsetting or overcoming some of the profit 
squeeze generated by higher wages. But the inducements are “carrots”  insofar as they can be 
had only after firms upgrade technologically, thereby producing positive effects on productivity 
growth and effective demand that sustain and perhaps increase the demand for labor. 
Hypothetically, at least, this process may lead to even further wage hikes. Case B then provides 
an explanation for why it is at least theoretically possible for wage growth that has outpaced 
productivity growth, or put differently, a decline in the profit share of income, to have had a 
positive effect on investment spending. 
 The positive correlation is confirmed by a look at the descriptive data. Figure 2 provides 
9 Case A assumes that higher wages result in reductions in export and investment demand that 
are not outweighed by increases in domestic consumption, induced by the redistribution to 
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time series data on the wage share of manufacturing income and capital accumulation (the 
growth rate of the capital stock). The wage share data are obtained by creating an index 
(1975=100) from the difference between changes in real daily manufacturing earnings and labor 
productivity growth. Increases in real earnings that exceed productivity growth cause the wage 
share index to rise.10  
[Figure 2 about here]. 
These data indicate that, with exception of the early 1990s, capital accumulation and the wage 
share variables moved in the same direction. (A similar result obtains if we plot lagged values of 
the wage share against capital accumulation). Interestingly, You’s (1994) argument that the 
state’s role in moderating labor-management conflict assuaged “animal spirits” is consistent with 
these data. The democratization movement that began in 1987 was accompanied not only by 
rapid wage increases which were not new, but also by widespread labor conflict. This also 
marked the beginning of more intensive efforts to liberalize financial markets and investment 
rules which may also have disrupted optimistic “animal spirits” through the introduction of more 
uncertainty. This turn of events seems to have to had a negative effect on investment spending. 
As the data in Figure 2 indicate, the early 1990s mark a break in the positive relationship 
between the wage share and capital accumulation, with the two moving in opposite directions 
thereafter. Thus at least up to 1990, wages would appear to have had a propelling force on 
investment spending. 
 Figure 3 is a scatter diagram in which quarterly data of the wage share (calculated as 
described above) are plotted against the natural logarithm of investment spending relative to the 
capital stock for the period 1975.1 to 1993.4. Here again we observe a positive relationship 
 
wages. 
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between the two variables. 
[Figure 3 about here]. 
A stronger test of whether the wage share has a positive impact on investment spending and thus 
capital accumulation will be explored in the next section where other plausible influences on 
investment spending are included in the analysis. 
 
IV. Theoretics and Empirical Test Results 
A. Some basic macro relations  
 Some basic macro equations are set out here to provide the basis for a reduced form 
estimable investment function. For simplicity, we assume a one-sector economy, with national 
income given by the following equation 
 
     PY = wbY + rPK.      (4) 
 
where P is the price level, Y is output, w is the nominal wage, and b is the labor coefficient. 
Dividing through by PY and using the definition for the profit rate (1) gives wage and profit 
shares of income 
     1 = Τb + Β      (5) 
 
where Τ is the real wage and Τb is the wage share of income.  Mark-up pricing (and thus excess 
capacity) prevails in this economy due to an oligopolistic market structure with prices set as a 
mark-up over prime unit costs or  
 
10 A more detailed explanation of how this variable is calculated is provided in Section III.b. 
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     P = (1+ϑ) (wb)                 
(6) 
 
where ϑ is the mark-up rate (ϑ >0). Semi-openness to trade and institutional constraints force 
producers to take into account foreign prices so that the mark-up is flexible, and the size is 
determined by the degree of monopoly power, external prices, and the exchange rate in the 
following fashion 
     ϑ = [:, A(eP*/P)Ρ]     (7) 
where : is the degree of monopoly in the domestic market, A is a constant parameter, P* is the 
price of finished foreign goods, and Ρ measures the mark-up’s responsiveness to changes in 
external price competitiveness.   
 Using (6), we can obtain a formal expression for the profit share of income   
    Β = ϑ / (1 + ϑ).                            
 (8) 
Together, equations (7) and (8) indicate that the profit share of income is affected by a variety of 
variables, including domestic market power, unit labor costs, and external factors such as the 
price of foreign goods and the nominal exchange rate. In implicit form,  
    Β = Β (:, w, b, P*, e, Ρ).     (9) 
Equations (8) and (9) imply that a nominal wage hike can induce a profit squeeze on export sales 
as firms lower their mark-up to remain competitive, thereby inducing a reduction in the profit 
share--and, obviously, an increase in the wage share.   
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 Based on Kaleckian theory, a modified reduced form investment function can be written 
in which the desired rate of capital accumulation depends on the wage share of income, the 
utilization rate, and the real interest rate, or  
                                ?    +  ! 
     I/K = GK = G ( Τb, u, Φ )    (10) 
 
 For estimation purposes, (11) can be written 
 
         I/K = GK  = bo + b1Τb + b2 u + b3Φ   (10') 
 
where Φ is the real interest rate. Following Marglin and Bhaduri’s emphasis on income shares, 
but replacing the profit share with the wage share, we argue that the wage share affects 
investment spending. Whether the effect of an increase in the wage share is to stimulate or to 
depress investment depends on the institutional and policy environment that shapes business 
decisions. There are several reasons for relying on the wage share instead of the profit share that 
are related to data availability. These are discussed below. The rate of utilization is included as 
an indicator of demand while the real rate of interest is added to account for neoclassical cost-of-
capital concerns. The question of interest is whether, after controlling for utilization and interest 
rates, aggregate investment responds positively to increases in the wage share, or, equivalently, 
declines in the profit share.  
 
B. Empirical Test of the Investment Function 
 Turning now to the empirical analysis of the determinants of investment spending, one of 
the difficulties with estimating (11') is the possibility of collinearity between Τb and u since 
shifts in the distribution of income are likely to have demand-side effects. If these variables are 
strongly collinear, then either of the two independent variables may not show up as significant. 
While it would be useful to estimate a full macro system to avoid this problem, we will see in the 
analysis that follows that in the case of Korea both variables have a measurable effect on 
investment.  
 Unlike in some previous studies on OECD countries, quarterly data are used in this 
analysis and cover the period 1976.2 to 1993.4, expanding the degrees of freedom and reliability 
of estimates. The rate of desired capital accumulation is measured as the ratio of gross fixed 
private capital formation to the capital stock. The use of quarterly rather than annual data 
provides another reason to use the wage share in place of the profit share, for which quarterly 
data are not available. (Another problem with using the profit share is that data were not 
available to impute a wage for the self-employed). Quarterly wage share data were created, based 
on the following calculation:  
) Τb  = ) w !) Χ  + ) b. 
As this expression implies, nominal wage growth that exceeds inflation and productivity growth 
(a decrease in the labor coefficient) causes the wage share to rise. Real earnings (Τ = w/P) are 
average nominal daily earnings in the manufacturing sector (monthly earnings adjusted for days 
worked) deflated by the manufacturing producer price index. Productivity data are for production 
workers in the manufacturing sector. These data were then used to synthetically create a wage 
share index.11 
 Measurement of the rate of manufacturing utilization is straightforward and this variable 
is also measured as an index. The real interest rate Φ is the nominal rate of interest on loans 
extended by the banking sector less the expected rate of inflation or ).ˆ( pi − The expected rate of 
                                                          
11 Converting the quarterly data to annual averages and plotting this against the net and gross 
profit share shows a roughly mirror image relationship, suggesting that this measure of the wage 
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inflation ( ) is measured as a weighted average of the GDP deflator for the four previous 
quarters or 
pˆ
)ˆ1.0ˆ2.0ˆ3.0ˆ4.0(ˆ 4321 −−−− +++= ttttt ppppp . 
 
Four quarter lags of the independent variables are included in the regressions, along with a time 
trend and a one quarter lag of the dependent variable to capture the partial adjustment nature of 
capital investment.  
 The investment function was first estimated with variables measured as first differences 
of natural logarithms (i.e., ) ln X) except for the real interest rate which could take on a negative 
value. The estimated equation took the form: 
 )ln(I/K)t =  
                  i=4                 i=4                     i=4       
 ∀o +  ∀1) ln(I/K)t-1  +  Ε ∀ 2 ) ln(Τb) t-i  +  Ε ∀6) ln ut-i   +  Ε ∀10 ) Φt-i  + ,t  .  
                    t=0                  t=0                     t=0   (11) 
           
The results of estimating (12) are shown as equation 1 in Table 2. The wage share variable is 
positive and significant, with the sum of the coefficients indicating an elasticity of 0.843--a ten 
percent increase in the wage share contributes to an 8.4 percent increase in investment relative to 
the capital stock. The utilization variable is also significant with investment responding 
positively and elastically (1.533) to an increase in the rate of utilization. The coefficient on the 
real interest rate is negative but insignificant, not surprising given the factors that influence 
access to credit and the evidence from other studies that the cost of capital is not a significant 
determinant of investment. 
[Table 2 about here]. 
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share is reliable.  
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 To assess robustness, the investment function was also estimated with independent 
variables untransformed and the dependent variable measured as a simple ratio (i.e., I/K). Those 
results are reported in equation 2 in Table 2.12 The results are broadly similar to those obtained 
in equation 1, with the exception of sum of the coefficients on the real interest rate which shows 
up in equation 2 as negatively and significantly correlated with investment although the size of 
the coefficient is extremely small. 
 Table 2 also gives equation diagnostics. Two tests for serial correlation are reported--the 
Durbin-Watson test and the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier test, the latter using 1 and 2 
lags. Results of testing for a structural break in 1989.2 (which correlates roughly with the 
beginning of the inverse relationship between the wage share and investment in Figure 2) are 
also given. The diagnostics for serial correlation are reasonably satisfactory although the 
Breusch-Godfrey test does indicate some evidence of this problem with two lags only in equation 
2. For that reason, equation 1 results with variables first differenced may be more reliable. The 
evidence of a structural break in 1989.4 is weak in equation 1 but stronger in equation 2. While it 
would be useful to split the sample, re-estimating the investment function for the pre- and post-
liberalization phase at the end of the 1990s, there are too few data points in the post-
liberalization period to obtain reliable coefficient estimates.   
 
C. Assessing Causality  
 A possible interpretation of the results in the previous section is that the direction of 
12 Equation 1 was also estimated with variables measured as logs (without first differencing) with 
similar results, but with some evidence of collinearity. The only major difference is that the sign 
on ∀1 was positive but insignificant in the latter equation. Numerous alternative specifications 
were tried, including using seasonally adjusted values of variables. All produced very similar 
results which are obtainable upon request. 
causality is not adequately captured by the model and that, in fact, it may be that investment is 
driving the wage share. Granger pair-wise causality tests are used to investigate this question. 
This  method uses F-tests to determine whether lagged values of a variable, say investment, has 
any statistically significant role in explaining lagged values of a second variable, say the wage 
share in the presence of  lagged values of the wage share. The test is then reversed with 
investment the dependent variable. If the F-statistic on the sum of the coefficients of the lagged 
values of the independent variable is statistically significant, that variable is said to Granger-
cause the dependent variable. The pair of test equations used for assessing the direction of 
causality between the wage share and investment are specified as follows:   
 
(a)     tit
n
i
it
n
i
iot bKIKI εωδϑβ +++= −
=
−
=
∑∑ )()/()/(
1
1
1
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 where n is the number of lags. 
For equation (a) the null hypothesis being tested is:  
 niH
n
i
iO ....1,0:
1
==∑
=
δ
                                            while for equation (b), the null is: 
niH
n
i
iO ....1,0:
1
==∑
=
γ  
Rules of thumb for interpreting test results are as follows. If both null hypotheses are accepted, 
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there is no evidence of causality in either direction. If the null for equation (a) is accepted but 
that for (b) is rejected, we can say that the wage share Granger-causes investment, but 
investment does not Granger-cause movements in the wage share. Finally, rejection of both null 
hypotheses implies feedback effects between the wage share and investment. 
 In general the results of the Granger tests are sensitive to the specified lag length. There 
is little theoretical guidance as to the lag lengths to specify in the case of investment and 
profitability.  For that reason and for purposes of robustness, we experiment with lag lengths of 
2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 quarters. The variables, measured both as logs and as ratios, were tested for 
stationarity prior to conducting the Granger tests by regressing each variable on a time trend. The 
data measured in natural logs showed signs of non-stationarity, and in this case, the time trend 
was removed by taking first differences. The data measured as ratios did not show a similar 
problem.  
 Granger pair-wise test results are presented in Table 3. Measuring the variables as first 
differences of natural logs, there is evidence of feedback effects between investment and the 
wage share for 2, 4, and 6 quarter lags. With longer lags, the data indicate that causality runs 
from investment to the wage share. When measured as ratios, however, the data indicate 
feedback effects for 4,6, and 10 quarter lags of the independent variable. In no case do the data 
suggest the causality runs exclusively from the wage share to investment. It is not unusual to 
have ambiguous results that vary by lag length, yet if we can draw some inferences from these 
data, it is that there are feedback effects between investment and wage share as we might expect 
from the schematic described in Figure 1.   
[Table 3 about here]. 
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 We might further ask whether wages are being driven by productivity growth, or whether 
it is productivity growth that determines wage growth. Table 4 shows the results of Granger tests 
that assess the direction of causality between real manufacturing wages and labor productivity 
growth for the period 1975.1-1990.12. The data are monthly, and variables are measured as first 
differences of natural logs. Evaluating the manufacturing sector as a whole, there appear to be 
strong feedback effects between wages and productivity. At the detailed industry level, results 
are varied. For textiles and machinery, there is quite strong evidence that wages drive 
productivity growth, whereas feedback effects are more apparent in wearing apparel and 
electronics. In the iron, steel, and transport sectors, there is very weak evidence that productivity 
growth affects wages in neoclassical fashion, but no evidence that wages stimulate productivity 
growth. The results for these two capital-intensive industries which were new in the late 1970s 
and have relied on borrowed technologies are not surprising since productivity growth there has 
depended not only on workers learning on-the-job but also on the scale of production with 
productivity rising more slowly than in other industries.  
[Table 4 about here]. 
 To sum the results of this section, the econometric results are consistent with the 
argument that firms respond to wage growth that exceeds productivity growth by increasing, not 
decreasing, investment. This stands in contrast to the evidence Bhaskar and Glyn (1995) and 
Bowles and Boyer (1995) provide for OECD countries, and certainly contrasts with some basic 
tenets of Kaleckian macro theory. But really the argument made here is not that profitability does 
not matter, but simply that the policy environment can alter the relationship between profits and 
investment, in some cases in very salutary ways--salutary ways, that is, insofar as the 
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relationship between growth and equity is concerned. It is also useful to note what we do not do 
here. We do not precisely unravel the dynamic between wages, productivity, and investment. We 
posit that a good deal of the productivity growth arises from firm investments, but Amsden’s 
argument that wage increases improve worker motivation and stimulate productivity growth may 
be valid as well.13 Indeed, it is entirely conceivable that both explanations are valid, but we do 
not have sufficient empirical evidence to definitively make that claim at this juncture. 
 
V. Conclusions and Summary 
 The question of how to construct a system in which a market economy is capable of 
coexisting peacefully with equity is one that interests heterodox economists. There is widespread 
and strong evidence that unrestrained capital produces an environment in which growth and 
equity are at odds. Macro models show that in open economies with liberalized capital flows 
when a more equitable distribution of income is attempted, firms respond at times hyper- 
sensitively to diminutions in profitability, thereby threatening the stability of the system and 
economic growth. The experience of South Korea since embarking on an export-led growth path 
would seem to provide one possible way to alter the investment climate so as to make possible a 
better distribution of income and growth, even in an open economy. In spite of Korea’s semi-
openness to trade in which wages have a potentially strong negative impact on aggregate demand 
via the effect on export demand, wage growth that exceeds productivity growth does not appear 
to bring down the system. Rather, firms are corralled by the state’s complex set of policies and 
13 Higher wages that improve worker motivation might be expected to produce positive effects 
on labor productivity sooner rather than later, whereas if wage hikes cause firms to adopt new 
technologies and production processes, the lagged effect on productivity may take longer to 
show up. The Granger tests did not, however, provide any clear evidence that one of these 
possibilities operated to the exclusion of the other.  
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institutional arrangements to respond to higher wages with productivity advances. 
 The case of Korea is instructive and it would be interesting to contrast it to other newly 
industrialized economies that have taken similar or divergent paths to assess the robustness of 
this argument. It would, for example, be very useful to look at the relationship between the wage 
share and investment in countries such as Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand, and Indonesia.  More 
generally, we can infer from this analysis that there is an important and beneficial role for the 
state to play in shaping the investment environment in order to both promote productivity growth 
and manage the distributional conflict in a way that does not shift all the costs to workers.  
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Table 1.-Net Sources of Finance for Investment by Non-Financial  
Corporate Sector, 1975-92 
(Percentages) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
 
     Mean  Standard Error 
                                                                                                                                                       
Internal     50.3%       0.005     
Bank Finance    23.1       0.024  
Bonds     11.6       0.014  
Equities    13.3       0.017    
Trade credits    !0.3       0.021  
Miscellaneous      2.1       0.010 
                                                                                                                                                        
Source: Author’s calculations from Bank of Korea National Income Accounts 1994 data. 
 
 Table 2.-OLS Estimates of Investment Function 
Dependent Variable: Gross Fixed Private Capital Formation/Capital Stock 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
                     Equation 1                  Equation 2   
          1976.2-1993.4           1976.1-1993.4 
                                                                                                                                                       
 Constant    !0.009   0.008  
          (0.23)   (0.35)  
 
 I/K(-1)        !0.775   0.050  
          (7.30)*  (0.77)    
     
 Τba          0.843   0.062    
          (3.01)***  (13.07)*    
       
 ua         1.553   0.0605   
         (3.33)*  (4.23)*                
 
 Φa        !0.018   !0.003 
          (0.48)   (6.57)*  
    
 Adjusted R2         0.84   0.79    
 SER          0.10   0.01    
 DW Statistic         2.07   2.06    
 LM AR(1)         0.64   0.29   
 LM AR(2)         0.99   7.73*   
 Chow (split 1989.2)        1.29   1.92** 
 Overall F       26.99*             19.63*    
                                                                                                                                                       
Notes: T-statistics are in parentheses. Regressions included a time trend variable. Equation 1 is 
log linear and is estimated in first differences. The dependent variable in Equation 2 is measured 
as ratios (I/K) and independent variables are the wage share and utilization rate measured and the 
real interest rate. Single, double, and triple asterisks indicate failure to pass relevant tests with  
p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.10, respectively.  
 
aSum of 1- 4 quarterly lags. 
 
 Table 3.-Granger Causality Test Results: Investment and the Wage Share 
F-Statistics on Sum of Coefficients of Lagged Independent Variable  
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
                    Number of quarterly lags employed 
                                                                                                                                      
Dependent    Independent       
Variable  Variable   2      4           6          8         10    
                                                                                                                                                                                            
) ln (I/K)  ) ln (Τb)           16.60*   1.98***       1.07  1.33          1.35  
) ln (Τb) ) ln (I/K)          10.14*           3.70*         2.77**  2.22**            2.20* 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
I/K                        Τb            0.07  10.14*      2.31**  1.45           4.46* 
Τb     I/K          12.76*           10.16*      4.21*  3.03*              2.74* 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Note:  Single, double, and triple asterisks indicate failure to pass relevant tests with p < 0.01,  
p < 0.05, and p < 0.10, respectively.  
  
 Table 4.-Granger Causality Test Results: Wages and Productivity 
F-Statistics on Sum of Coefficients of Lagged Independent Variable  
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
                   Number of monthly lags employed 
                                                                                                                                                         
Dependent      Independent       
Variable          Variable      2      4       6             8           10            12         18        24        30        36 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Manufacturing Sector 
 
) ln (b)         ) ln (Τ)  11.8*    7.2*     3.4*      3.7*        3.6*       2.1**       1.3       1.5***    1.1      0.9 
) ln (Τ)        ) ln (b)   2.3***     8.2*     4.1*      3.8*        2.9*      1.8**       1.4       0 .9       0.9      0.8 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Textiles 
 
) ln (b)         ) ln (Τ)   7.9*    4.8*     3.1*      2.3**     2.0**      1.6***     1.4       1.6***    1.3      1.6** 
) ln (Τ)        ) ln (b)   0.7          1.9     1.3      1.1         1.5      1.2        0.9       0 .9       0.6      0.6 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Wearing Apparel 
 
) ln (b)         ) ln (Τ)  16.9*     9.2*     8.3*      6.3*       5.2*        3.7*         2.1**     2.2**     2.0**    1.6** 
) ln (Τ)        ) ln (b)   4.2*          2.6**     1.6      3.1*       2.5*     2.2**        1.8**      1.2       0.9      0.7 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Electronics 
 
) ln (b)         ) ln (Τ)   4.4*    2.7*     2.7*     1.8***    2.3**      1.8**       1.4        1.3         1.4***  1.6** 
) ln (Τ)        ) ln (b)   2.1           2.4**     1.9***    3.4*        1.9**      1.9**       1.7          1.3       1.1      0.7 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Iron/Steel 
 
) ln (b)         ) ln (Τ)   0.5      0.6     1.3       1.5         1.8***     1.4           1.1         0.8         1.0      0.8 
) ln (Τ)        ) ln (b)   2.4***      1.2     1.9***     1.6         1.3        1.3          1.0         1 2         1.1      0.9 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Transport 
 
) ln (b)         ) ln (Τ)   0.2      0.4      0.2       0.4         0.7           0.5          0.4          0.5        0.8      0.7 
) ln (Τ)        ) ln (b)   2.4***      1.5      1.1       0.9         0.7           0.6          0.5          0 .8      1.0      1.1 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Machinery 
 
) ln (b)         ) ln (Τ)   7.0*     4.1*     3.1*      2.0**     1.7***     1.9**      2.0**      1.5***   1.3      0.9 
) ln (Τ)        ) ln (b)   1.7            0.7     0.7      0.6          0.9       0.7       0.8        1 19       1.1      0.6 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Note: Real earnings are nominal monthly earnings deflated by the manufacturing producer price index. Labor 
productivity is for production workers only. Single, double, and triple asterisks indicate failure to pass relevant tests 
with p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.10, respectively.  
 
Figure 1. The relationship between wages and investment under alternative scenarios 
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